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How might educators arrange social studies curriculum in ways that address how historical and 
contemporary evils come to pass in ways that highlight ordinary people working collectively as 
agents of change? This paper supplies one possible avenue: applying Alain Badiou’s 
understanding of some evils as simulacra to stories of resistance from the Nazi-occupied 
Netherlands. Through a discourse analysis of interviews with my paternal grandparents, I 
provide an example of how teachers might supplement the study of the Second World War with 
the educational aim of encouraging becoming subjects, who think independently from authority 
but interconnectedly with others. In this way, teachers might make historical events more 
personal in their classrooms, allowing students to explore how ordinary, interconnected people 
drive societies, as opposed to singular heroes or villains. Stories of resistance interpreted 
through the philosophy of Badiou provide one ethical springboard for students and teachers to 
consider how they might act under similar circumstances. Personal anecdotes are powerful tools 
in shaping knowledge and attitudes; thus, stories of resistance in our classrooms are vital as we 
seek to make emancipatory and egalitarian changes to our world. 
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Comment les éducatrices et les éducateurs peuvent-ils organiser le programme d'études 
sociales de manière à déterminer comment les maux historiques et contemporains se 
produisent et de manière à mettre en évidence les gens ordinaires travaillant collectivement en 
tant que des agents du changement ? Cet article fournit une avenue possible : appliquer la 
compréhension d'Alain Badiou de certains maux comme des simulacres aux histoires de 
résistance des Pays-Bas occupés par les nazis. À travers une analyse du discours des entretiens 
avec mes grands-parents paternels, je donne un exemple de la façon dont les enseignantes et 
les enseignants pourraient compléter l'étude de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale au but éducatif 
de leur encourager à devenir des sujets qui pensent indépendamment de l'autorité mais en 
interconnexion avec des autres. De cette façon, les enseignantes et les enseignants pourraient 
rendre les événements historiques plus personnels dans leurs classes, permettant aux élèves 
d'explorer comment les gens ordinaires et interconnectés dirigent les sociétés, par opposition 
aux héros ou méchants singuliers. Les histoires de résistance interprétées à travers la 
philosophie de Badiou fournissent un point de départ éthique aux élèves et aux enseignant(e)s 
pour réfléchir à la manière dont ils pourraient agir dans des circonstances similaires. Les 
anecdotes personnelles sont de puissants outils pour façonner les connaissances et les attitudes; 
ainsi les histoires de résistance dans nos salles de classe sont vitales alors que nous cherchons à 
apporter des changements émancipateurs et égalitaires à notre monde. 
 
 











All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.  
–attributed to Edmund Burke 
So many kids died. 
       –Johanna, my grandmother 
ow might we engage with the horrors of history, in our classrooms (and beyond), in ways 
that are harmonious with our broader educational concerns? By educational, I wish to 
emphasize the process of subjectification—how we “come to exist as subjects of 
initiative and responsibility rather than as objects of the actions of others” (Biesta, 2015, p. 77). As a 
former high school social studies teacher and now as an instructor of preservice teachers, I have 
been wrestling with this question. It is common to hear a rationale along the lines of prevention; for 
example, that we must learn about genocides so that others may not occur (Marks, 2017). However, 
in my classes (and at times in myself), I noticed that teaching a bare historical narrative of atrocities 
resulted in a fixation on cold facts (e.g., death tolls), in a despair that humans have been awful and 
would always continue to be, and in feelings of powerlessness to do anything about these horrors of 
history. Accordingly, the questions for me became: How might I arrange curriculum in a way that fits 
with my understanding of how evils come to pass, and how might I develop the sense that ordinary 
people working collectively are agents of change more so than individuals? 
This paper is one of many responses to those questions. Here, I engage with stories from a 
resistance movement through the lens of Alain Badiou’s (1993/2001) understandings of truths and 
evils. For this paper I performed a discourse analysis on stories of my grandparents from the Nazi-
occupied Netherlands, interpreting and extrapolating the text through Badiou’s ethics. My hope is 
that teachers and students who engage with their stories are encouraged to see their capabilities as 
becoming subjects—as those who have “enter[ed] into the composing of a subject” where their 
bodies and abilities are “called upon to enable the passing of a truth along its path” (Badiou, 
1993/2001, pp. 41-42). After providing an introduction to Badiou’s philosophy and describing my 
approach of discourse analysis, I recount stories from my grandparents, and I apply Badiou’s insights 
to my analysis of their stories. I then outline some possible implications for education. Despite my 
claims of benefits from working with this approach, there are some cautions, as Brenda Trofanenko 
(2017) aptly noted: “Understanding what was said and what was heard and how both may, 
intentionally and unintentionally, elicit an emotional response is often ignored” (p. 151). As such, if 
educators wish to engage their students with this project, or one of a similar topic, I urge them to 
consider the emotional aspects of such educational endeavours, a consideration beyond the scope of 
this paper, but which has been explored in helpful ways by scholars in education (e.g., Boler, 1999; 
Britzman, 2013; Zembylas, 2007), as well as specifically in social studies education (e.g., Levy & 
Sheppard, 2018; Sheppard, Katz, & Grosland, 2015). 
Badiou’s General Anthropology of Truths 
Badiou begins with an ontological premise of equality. The differences that so often divide us 







which is not yet, so differences then are precisely what truths depose, or render insigniﬁcant” 
(Badiou, 1993/2001, p. 27). A truth procedure is the process of engaging with a situation once the 
images and ideas we have learned about the situation have shattered. In this way, a becoming 
subject begins to develop. Such a situation is not an “a-ha” situation; rather, it is closer to an “oh no”. 
The assumptions that had previously gone unchallenged become contested, and the becoming 
subject is called upon to think, and perhaps act, differently. A comparison here can be made to 
Dąbrowski’s (1964) theory of positive disintegration, whereby certain constraints from 
socialization/integration need to be disintegrated for individual existential choices to occur (e.g., 
dissent from authority or the norm), although Badiou emphasizes everyone’s equal potential for 
disintegration and, thus, for processes of becoming. 
Such a shattering occurs when we come across an event, which is an encounter with the void. 
The void is “the multiple of nothing, [and thus] neither excludes nor constrains anyone” (Badiou, 
1993/2001, p. 73). The void is a vanishing point that shatters the legitimacy of what we had thought 
or desired: 
At any given and unpredictable moment one may encounter a person, a thought, a question, 
that causes an “event” utterly voiding the legitimacy of what we just had thought or desired 
about ourselves or anything in particular (e.g., how falling in love shatters everything we 
thought about “our” situation as any-“one” minding our own business before the “event” of 
“falling” in love). (den Heyer, 2015, p. 14) 
An encounter with the void is an opportunity to rethink all the points we took as the realities of our 
situation; that is, we question what we had taken for granted. Our concept of reality is ruptured and 
thus creates space for new thinking. A person, thought, or really anything, can instigate such an 
event, but we cannot predict or manufacture an event. All we can do is be attentive to an event’s 
possibility (den Heyer & Conrad, 2011). 
When an event occurs, such as realizing one’s status in the context of structural oppression, we 
must remain faithful to it by thinking about the present situation from the perspective of the event 
as becoming subjects. We can no longer suppress that knowledge and are called upon to act 
accordingly to dismantle oppressive structures and practices, and to create a society where such 
oppression becomes impossible. Events supplement our ordinary, day-to-day circumstances. 
Becoming subjects partake in a “trans-individual act” via an event—a subjective experience that ties 
people together in a way that is radical because “it does not originate in any structure supported 
within being or the situation, such as the socio-economic” (Critchley, 2012, p. 26). We then must 
remain steadfastly faithful to this event—the creation of something new—by moving within this 
novel situation, thinking about it in relation to the event, and finally inventing this new way of being 
whether it be in love, art, science, or politics. The uncontrollable nature of an event opens up 
potentialities that we did not previously realize, but, in turn, we must actively strive to honour our 
truth procedure: “The event creates a possibility but there, then, has to be an effort—a group effort 
in the political context, an individual one in the case of artistic creation—for this possibility to 
become real” (Badiou & Tarby, 2010/2013, p. 10). For Badiou, the only prescription is a call to be 
faithful to the truth procedure; it does not set a firm path for us to follow. In this sense Badiou is not 





constructing a philosophical system, but rather “a general anthropology of truth” (Barbour, 2010, p. 
253). In other words, Badiou does not prescribe a truth; instead, he lays the foundation for us to 
identify and follow any one of many truth procedures. You can then choose (or not) to pursue a truth 
procedure that results from an event and breaks through what you had previously considered to be 
common sense. Fidelity to a truth procedure is the essence of ethics. 
According to Alain Badiou (1993/2001), evil does not exist in a vacuum; rather, evil is a failure 
of the good. He defined evil as the result of humans failing or perverting a truth procedure (i.e., the 
activity of an emerging truth). His philosophy asks us to consider why some people instigate or 
participate in atrocities, and why some form a resistance, while others go along with the tide. Stanley 
Milgram (1963) conducted pivotal research on obedience and found that being around others who 
disobeyed authority gave people the strength to stand up for what they believed to be right 
(Milgram, 1965). This observation, then, leads to the question of how we might work towards people 
standing up in the first place. How might we encourage our students (and ourselves) to think more 
independently from authority? The task is less about educating good citizens and more about 
education that is connected “to love for the world” (Hodgson, Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2017, p. 19). 
Education is fundamentally about study which, for Pinar (2015) is “like prayer . . . a stance we assume 
in the world . . . it is an ethics” (p. 15). Badiou’s understanding of ethics is affirmative—he begins with 
what is good, and then evil is a failure or perversion of what might be good. Everyone, then, has 
equal capability to uphold the good. 
The Evil of Simulacra 
Badiou characterizes evil as resulting from the one of the following: betraying your truth 
procedure; imposing your truth upon others; or mistaking simulacra for truth procedures. This paper 
focuses on how we might respond to the latter evil, that of the simulacrum, which Badiou defines as 
a sort of false truth procedure that occurs when a radical break in a situation convokes not the void 
but the “full” particularity or presumed substance of the situation with which we are dealing (Badiou, 
1993/2001, p. 73). The supposed novelty is, in fact, part of the situation already in existence. Thus, the 
pseudo-event, the simulacrum, “then become[s] identified with an already established group” (Smith, 
2006, p. 96). These already established peoples, the pseudo-subjects, are the only ones addressed by 
the simulacrum, in contrast with an event that is open to anyone. A simulacrum only appears to be 
an event. What the pseudo-subject names as the site of the event is only what superficially appears 
to be the site, and thus the pseudo-subject remains an individual and does not become a subject 
because this individual is not responding to an event (Smith, 2006, p. 96).This circumstance denies 
the possibility of a trans-individual act because of the foreclosure of the possibility of uniting people 
regardless of their identity or characteristics. An encounter with the void is an opportunity to rethink 
all the points we took as the realities of our situation; whereas, a simulacrum reinforces something 
already in existence for a select group of people, thus preventing new thinking, by failing to create 
space. 
As an example of the evil of the simulacrum, Badiou (1993/2001) discussed the German Nazis 






nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They did not break with the contemporary situation and thus 
they did not produce a new truth. The Nazi pursuit of a supposed truth was nothing more than a 
“continuity with [that which came] before . . . faithful only to the alleged national substance of a 
people” (Badiou, 1993/2001, p. 73); the Nazis assumed one way to be German, one way to be a Jew, 
and so on. Furthermore, although everyone is equally capable of a truth procedure, becoming 
subjects could not be created because the Nazis had already preordained who were included 
(Aryans) and who were not (non-Aryans). The Nazi “event” was a pseudo-event—a simulacrum. 
Related to simulacra of truths is Badiou’s notion of terror. Terror occurs when those who 
challenge the adherence to a simulacrum are simply discarded as detrimental to the promised day-
to-come. An example of this sort of terror would be the arrests and executions of the White Rose 
group of university students in Germany for their defiance of the Nazi regime. Those who failed to 
uphold the simulacrum felt the wrath of the regime, and yet there were those who nonetheless 
resisted, such as the Danes, who relayed intelligence, sabotaged the occupying Nazis and rescued 
most Jewish people in Denmark from certain death (Burgan, 2010). 
Engaging With Oral and Written Stories 
The data for the discourse analysis I performed came from stories told by my grandparents 
during their time in the Netherlands during the Second World War, specifically their experiences 
during the Nazi occupation. I define “data” literally from the Latin: the gifts that have been given. For 
this project, these gifts are the stories told to my family members over time. Family oral history 
“originates with the stories families tell each other around the dinner table, on a long drive, or in 
response to a query whenever a family gathers” (Brockmann, 2017, p. 273). For many years when 
they came to visit, my Aunt Carla filmed her parents (my paternal grandparents), Anthonius and 
Johanna, speaking about their experiences from the Second World War (among other stories of their 
youth). Also, before my grandfather’s death in 1995, my Aunt Johanna interviewed him more 
formally about his experiences, and my grandmother allowed my cousin and his wife to film her a 
few months before her death in 2017. Approaching death heightens our already deep psychological 
need for symbolic immortality through identity preservation (Becker, 1973; Unruh, 1983), and thus 
my grandmother’s last interviews, in this case, likely served as a comforting legacy project that 
emotionally bound her story to those who were listening (and who would later listen). I, myself, 
travelled to interview her, but arrived only in time to bring companionship and love in her dying 
days. My grandparents wanted to tell their story—at first to their family, but then to a wider 
audience, and my grandmother seemed proud to share her experiences with her children and 
grandchildren, and, on a number of occasions, was pleased that her stories were told beyond the 
family (e.g., through my cousin’s school project). 
Like any method, personal interviews transcribed for a discourse analysis are complicated 
truths about the past (Freund, 2014). More important than a comprehensive history is the ability of 
oral history education to produce a grassroots sense of democracy (Llewellyn & Ng-A-Fook, 2017). 
As witnesses to historical events, my grandparents provided relatable stories that sparked an 
engagement different from that of a broader, nonpersonal narrative. One of the most difficult tasks I 





faced was to “determine what constitutes the verbal event” and how the written word as I typed it 
flattened the speech because of the loss of accent, pronunciation, pauses and other aspects of 
speech (Brown & Yule, 2003, p. 9). Despite only providing highlights of the stories they told over the 
years during this project, I wanted to keep the personal aspect, because information by itself is 
insufficient. People do not change their views or behaviour merely because they are presented with 
verified evidence. Anecdotal information and personal experience seem to have a more profound 
impact on people’s opinions, so long as it is in a specific context and not in the abstract (Crocco, 
Halvorsen, Jacobsen, & Segall, 2017). There is immense power in a story, and therein lies possibilities 
to explore ways of provoking thought about how we might live together. My interest was in how 
these stories can function in relation to those who encounter them. These stories, like many oral 
histories, reveal neglected, or even “unknown aspects of known events” (Portelli, 1998, p. 67), and 
provide an opportunity for listeners to make meaning in relation with each other. I saw this data as 
evidence for a society at a particular time, especially experiences that I deemed relevant to present 
concerns (e.g., resisting fascist actions). This paper focuses on my paternal grandparents’ story of 
resistance within the Nazi-occupied territory of The Netherlands, and excerpts from their interviews 
are indicated in italics in the following sections. 
Implicating Ordinary Folk 
Anyone, anytime, can encounter truth procedures or simulacra. Johanna, the woman who 
became my grandmother, was an ordinary young woman in the town of Veenendaal, in the 
Netherlands, who was caught in the middle of the Nazi simulacrum. Although it might be easy to 
assume that living in occupied territory led to a singular focus on the troubling times, people kept 
living their lives. Johanna tried to carry on as she always had: Always the same, I never changed. They 
said I always smiled, I never looked miserable. Anthonius, my future grandfather, was just starting his 
adult life when the war arrived in the Netherlands: When Germany invaded Holland in 1940, I was a 
young man working in a wholesale grocery store. For many Dutch people, the transition was quick 
and almost felt like it did not happen, which led many to think life would not necessarily change 
much. Soon, however, Dutch Jews were rounded up, and life for all Dutch people changed: The 
Germans took everything—all the food, trucks, cars, equipment, and anything they thought might be 
of value to them. In fact, because there was nothing left, there was no work and nothing to do. Many 
(but not all) folks in the Netherlands had the following options: adapting, collaborating or resisting. 
Because the Nazis considered many Dutch people to be Aryan, some could become Nazis, if they 
wished. The reasons some chose to collaborate included motives such as selfish gain or the 
understandable desire to protect their families. A few, however, chose the harder path. Instead of 
adhering (intentionally or otherwise) to the terroristic imposition of the Nazi simulacrum, some 
Dutch people resisted. Some took a principled stance, others perhaps not. This resistance could take 
a variety of forms. In Anthonius’ case, it took the form of sabotage and violence, and for Johanna, it 
took the form of smuggling supplies and providing safe spaces for those who needed it. 
Resisting a Simulacrum 






inconvenient and dangerous. After the occupation began, Dutch men between the ages of 16 and 60 
were ordered to register with the occupying forces, thus enlisting in the German army. Anthonius 
and others refused. Many young men, including myself, decided that we would not register but 
would form our own underground unit of the resistance army. This meant that I would have to leave 
home and find a place to live, as well as a place to store equipment and supplies with which to 
harass the enemy. Like his fellow resisters, Anthonius hid his identity, using an alias for a fake 
identification card, and even perming and dying his hair to avoid being recognized. While in the 
underground resistance, he met Johanna and they started dating, and she quickly became involved: 
Really, I was part of the underground, too. I can’t believe how I did it. . . . I don’t know how we 
survived it. Anthonius and other resisters operated from hideaways, often literally under the ground, 
stocked with beds, a stove, and sometimes food that they could redistribute to those in need. Food 
was often short, and more frequently than they would like, they lived off potatoes and apples. They 
would snare rabbits to supplement their food stores. 
Open fighting during the day would be suicide, so they took action at night when they could. 
We would use every possible chance to hit them where it hurt, at night: trains, oil depots, food 
supplies, cars, gasoline, railway tracks, buildings, hydro. . . . One night we were asked if we possibly 
could immobilize quite a large bunch of German vehicles, which were parked overnight outside the 
walls of a castle, which was surrounded by a moat filled with water about four feet deep. Because 
there was only one soldier on duty, and the drawbridge was up, they felt quite secure. They were 
having quite a drinking party. We waded across the moat, had a nice chat with the only guard, then 
proceeded to drain every bit of oil and gas, plus destroy alternators from all those dozens of vehicles, 
thereby making them rather useless for quite a period of time. 
As fascinating as that story is, it is important to note that a dedication to resisting and 
subverting a simulacrum does not guarantee a righteous path without complexities. The trite saying, 
“do the right thing,” is well-intentioned, and yet, can we really know what will be judged as moral 
(and by whom we will be judged)? Instead, we might ask what the consequences of our 
commitments might be. In this case, my family history is not about glorifying relatives as perfect 
heroes. We all are capable of both helping and hurting, and understanding this uncomfortable reality 
is beneficial for imagining (and perhaps someday applying to) our own (in)actions when faced with 
similar conundrums. Would we act similarly, or not? Why? And, to what end? 
The town of Renswoude had a group like the underground resistance in Veenendaal. They 
spotted a German man wandering around the camp, but not in uniform. He said he had fled the 
German army. They asked him, “Where did you get the clothes?” And he responded that he stole 
them. The folks at Renswoude felt that they could neither take him in nor let him leave. Anthonius 
and a few others went to help. They thought to themselves: What are we going to do? There’s only 
one thing to do. Anthonius and the others talked with the German man and he seemed sincere, but 
when the sun came up, they blindfolded him in a gravel pit and shot him. How does one judge 
whether this execution was right or wrong? At the time, it was difficult, and years later easy answers 
are still elusive: What can you do? It sounds awful now. It was impossible for Anthonius to know if 
the German man was telling the truth, and—either way—it is debateable if the execution was the 





“right” thing to do. As Anthonius’ granddaughter, I cannot decide how I feel about the incident. I 
ponder this situation much as I consider the famous “trolley problem” from ethical philosophy (i.e., a 
runaway trolley is about to run over five people, and you have the option of diverting the trolley so 
that it only kills one). Issues of personal participation versus statistical harm reduction prevent a clear 
answer as to what is right. How does one decide what a lesser evil is? And, how might we know for 
sure if killing the one would benefit the five? Badiou’s philosophy shuns the idea of a singular truth, 
and thus the idea of a predetermined correct response. I can foresee a lively classroom discussion of 
Anthonius and his companions’ dilemma, so long as the difficult knowledge (Britzman, 2000, 2013) of 
the situation is taken into account, and the teacher considers what might be necessary emotional 
and cognitive preconditions in their particular classroom before such a discussion occurs. 
Although there were horrors perpetuated by Germans and by the Dutch, there were also acts 
of kindness and love, as some folks refused to give up their sense of community. They remained 
faithful to their truth procedures of what it meant to be good. Every day, Johanna’s mother made a 
big jug of chocolate milk from their farm’s supply and gave it to the nearby school—We weren’t 
allowed to do this, but we did it anyways—despite the chances of being caught and punished.  
Consequences of Subverting a Simulacrum 
There are consequences to impeding a simulacrum, not only for the resisters, but also for their 
loved ones. The pseudo-subjects terrorize those who do not adhere to their vision. At one point, a 
collaborator recognized Anthonius and reported back to the occupying forces. The Germans arrived 
while Anthonius was visiting his “honey”. 
While I was there [visiting Johanna’s home], there was a loud knock at the door. Sensing that 
something was wrong, I jumped over the table and went out through the back door into the 
barn. In Holland, most barns are attached directly to the house. This barn was especially dark, 
but I knew of a small trap door in the high ceiling with a ladder up to it. I scrambled up this 
ladder, pulled it up after me and waited while I heard the Germans in the house demanding to 
be shown where I was. My girlfriend fainted and my [future] father-in-law started to raise hell 
until the Germans told him that if he didn’t sit down and shut his mouth, they would shoot 
him. They then put my [future] mother-in-law against the wall and gave her two minutes to tell 
them where I was, or they would shoot her. 
They demanded to know where Anthonius was. They put the gun to her chest. She looked them 
straight in the eyes and refused. 
My mother-in-law immediately told them that they might as well shoot her right away because 
she did not know where I was. She then added that even if she did know she wouldn’t tell 
them. I guess they believed her because they let her sit down. Then they proceeded to destroy 
everything in the house. I do not believe there was anything of value left when they departed. 
Dishes, beds, clothing, stoves, basins—just about everything were destroyed. They stayed there 
all day until late evening. Then, they left saying that they would be back. 
Eventually, it was quiet and Anthonius came down. He walked up the street. There were many 






it to a friend’s place where they made a hole in the wall behind a cabinet to access the space under 
the roof. He slept a number of nights there. To help Anthonius return to the camp of the other 
resisters, Johanna arranged to buy a police uniform. She put the uniform in a potato bag with 
ammunitions, grenades and other items, in a cart, hidden under wood shavings so she could deliver 
them to Anthonius. 
Near the end of the war, the Nazis were only allowing people in Veenendaal one hour per day 
to get in and out of their houses because the town was near the front line. One day, Johanna’s 
family’s cows were out and very agitated because there was shooting nearby. Johanna’s dad was 
about to set up to gather them, but she offered because she did not think the Nazi soldiers would 
shoot her. Her brother decided to come, too. The shooting began and she jumped to the ground 
and began to crawl. She made it to an earth shelter, but there was no room. Johanna convinced 
those already in the shelter to take her brother in, and she tried to make it to a barn. She was shot. 
Down on the ground, she crawled along the building to get to the door. She was then shot a few 
more times. One bullet was just underneath her heart. Her family could see what was happening 
from their window, horrified as the situation unfolded. Another brother put a white tablecloth on a 
stick and ran over to her. They took her to the wool factory, where they had made a makeshift 
hospital. The folks there had to dig for a bullet lodged in her hip and then stitch her up. A few hours 
later, the factory/hospital was bombed, but Johanna was not ready to be moved, so they took her to 
the basement. Once Johanna could be transported, her family made a bed for her in the root cellar 
of their home because, in the meantime, their house had been bombed. 
We were happy to be alive. 
Just as Badiou (1993/2001) noted a becoming subject requires fidelity to a truth procedure, a 
similar fidelity is needed to continue fighting against a simulacrum and its ensuing terror. A group 
effort allows for the possibility of good to prevail (Badiou & Tarby, 2010/2013). Those involved in a 
truth procedure and those resisting a simulacrum must choose between upholding the good or 
taking the easier path toward evil. It is understandable why someone might betray what is good. In 
the case of Anthonius and Johanna, they could easily have collaborated with the Germans. They were 
White, and neither Jewish nor communist, so they could have been absorbed into the new political 
state of affairs. Instead of taking this path, they chose to remain militant in their ethical 
commitments. They saw beyond their individual, particular situation and chose to work with 
members of their community to fight the Nazi simulacrum and its associated terror, which the 
German army was maintaining. The hope, then, was to outsmart and outlast the simulacrum, and my 
grandparents, through both luck and skill, were able to do just that. Although resisters put their lives 
at risk, Anthonius and Johanna survived the war and married, and then, in the 1950s, immigrated 
with their young family, including my father, to Canada, to begin a new life. 
Implications for Education 
Engaging the classroom with a particular story of resistance, informed by the philosophy of 
Alain Badiou, has a number of benefits. One benefit is to supplement the depersonalized 





descriptions often found in textbooks. In social studies classes, the Second World War is commonly 
taught, and yet the focus tends to be on the overall scope of the war and associated horrors (e.g., 
massive casualties of soldiers and civilians, the Holocaust) and not on how ordinary people took 
action. The personalization of war could be accomplished by engaging with the stories in this article, 
but perhaps teachers could consider stories of resilience from their own or their students’ families’ 
past. 
Combining Badiou’s philosophy with a particular wartime story makes his ideas 
understandable without flattening their complexity. Also, through such a framing, teachers and 
students can engage with a specific set of philosophical ethics that may encourage them to 
persevere in goodness. Hallward (2013) argued that Badiou gives us the discipline to make 
emancipatory, egalitarian changes to our world. Moral codes can feel prescriptive and limiting, but 
Badiou’s ethics provide an affirmative ethical stance that may be empowering and may encourage 
everyone, despite any perceived difference, to stand up for truths and against evils. On a related 
note, I feel that it is important to encourage interconnected, community-based theories of change. 
Although the stories of Anthonius and Johanna are personal stories, they are housed within the 
context of their communities. Rather than being solitary actors, Anthonius and Johanna drew 
strength from family and other community members. Furthermore, their honesty about their daily 
activities and their moral quandaries, particularly Anthonius’ description of his participation in the 
killing of a German man clothed like a civilian, allow us to see complexity in our actions. When 
students see historical change as occurring by formidable individuals—either perfect heroes or 
uncomplicated villains—they can feel disempowered in their own lives (e.g., Alridge, 2006; Epstein, 
1994; van Kessel & Crowley, 2017; Woodson, 2016). There is a need to thwart the inaccurate 
assumption that social change occurs through the intentions and deeds of extraordinary individuals; 
rather, teachers and students need to explore the actions of ordinary people working together.  
There are links between Badiou’s philosophy and anti-totalitarian education, particularly anti-
fascist education, which is as important now as it was in the Interwar Period (Albright, 2018; Fallace, 
2017). Totalitarian education is marked by blind obedience to authority, among other characteristics, 
as seen in the schooling systems of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Fallace, 2017; Kandel, 1935; 
Ziemer, 1941). How might we know when we need to take action against an authority? Badiou’s 
identification of a simulacrum may help us see a troubling situation without the benefit of hindsight, 
and Anthonius and Johanna’s story is an exemplar of how resisting a simulacrum may be difficult 
emotionally and physically. With Badiou, we have an opportunity to interrogate the harmful 
situations that plague societies in a way that might strengthen our resolve to uplift networks of 
support to stand up against evil. 
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